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Abstract
We use national survey data to examine the extent to which various sources of political information expose
people to dissimilar political views. We hypothesize that the individual's ability and desire to exercise selective
exposure is a key factor in determining whether a given source produces exposure to dissimilar views.
Although a lack of diverse perspectives is a common complaint against American news media, we find that
individuals are exposed to far more dissimilar political views via news media than through interpersonal
political discussants. The media advantage is rooted in the relative difficulty of selectively exposing oneself to
those sources of information, as well as the lesser desire to do so, given the impersonal nature of mass media.
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Facilitating Communication across Lines of Political Difference:
The Role of Mass Media
DIANA C. MUTZ The Ohio State University
PAUL S. MARTIN University of Oklahoma
W e use national survey data to examine the extent to which various sources of political informationexpose people to dissimilar political views. We hypothesize that the individual’s ability and desireto exercise selective exposure is a key factor in determining whether a given source produces
exposure to dissimilar views. Although a lack of diverse perspectives is a common complaint against
American news media, we find that individuals are exposed to far more dissimilar political views via news
media than through interpersonal political discussants. The media advantage is rooted in the relative
difficulty of selectively exposing oneself to those sources of information, as well as the lesser desire to do so,
given the impersonal nature of mass media.
The extent to which people are exposed to cross-cutting political viewpoints has become of in-creasing concern to observers of American pol-
itics. Advocates of deliberative democracy believe such
exposure is essential in order for alternatives to be
contrasted effectively (Fishkin 1991). Others consider
exposure to dissimilar views indispensable in forming
valid opinions and in learning to appreciate the per-
spectives of others (Arendt 1968; Benhabib 1992). Still
others point to the value of exposure to cross-cutting
views for purposes of establishing political legitimacy.
Exposure to cross-cutting views ensures “that no one
could see the end result as arbitrary rather than
reasonable and justifiable, even if not what he or she
happened to see as most justifiable” (Fearon 1998, 62,
emphasis in original).
Exposure to conflicting views is deemed a central
element—if not the sine qua non—of the kind of
political dialogue needed to maintain a democratic
citizenry (e.g., Barber 1984; Bellah et al. 1985; Haber-
mas 1989). In contrast, political talk that centers on
reinforcing a shared viewpoint does little to encourage
deliberation on multiple perspectives or promote a
public sphere (Calhoun 1988, 220; Schudson 1995).
According to the most often cited proponent of com-
munication across lines of difference, John Stuart Mill,
“if the opinion is right, [people] are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong,
they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth produced by
its collision with error” (Mill [1859] 1956, 21). Mill’s
statement points to two potential benefits of exposure
to oppositional views, the opportunity to change one’s
mind and adopt a normatively better viewpoint, and
the deeper understanding of one’s own position ac-
quired through confronting different perspectives. A
third benefit is legitimation of an undesired outcome.
To the extent that people are at least exposed to
rationales for views with which they disagree, even an
outcome they do not like acquires greater legitimacy.
For example, the literature on political tolerance
argues that education is important because it “puts a
person in touch with people whose ideas and values are
different from one’s own” (Stouffer 1955, 127, emphasis
in original). Likewise, differences in tolerance between
men and women and between urban and rural resi-
dents have been attributed to the more parochial
contacts of women and rural dwellers (Nunn, Crockett,
and Williams 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus
1982). Along similar lines, authoritarianism is nega-
tively related to diversity of experience (Altemeyer
1996; Marcus et al. 1995), and politically diverse per-
sonal networks increase awareness of oppositional
viewpoints and political tolerance (Mutz 1999).
In short, both in political theory and empirical work,
there is near unanimous agreement that exposure to
diverse political views is good for democracy and
should be encouraged. Most social scientists concur
that political attitudes and opinions are formed
through social interaction, political discussion, and
personal reflection, and these processes are of a higher
quality when people are exposed to dissimilar perspec-
tives. Nonetheless, there is little empirical work on the
contexts in which such exposure occurs. Moreover, the
recent trend toward residential balkanization based on
shared lifestyles heightens concerns about communica-
tion across lines of political difference in the United
States. To the extent that people live among homoge-
neous others in self-selected enclaves, their exposure to
dissimilar views may be limited.
Some theorists propose that the future of communi-
cation across lines of political difference lies in tech-
nologies that transcend geographic space. As Calhoun
(1988, 225) argues, “in modern societies, most of the
information we have about people different from our-
selves comes not through any direct relationships, even
the casual ones formed constantly in urban streets and
shops. Rather it comes through print and electronic
media.” Yet, much of what is known about the struc-
ture and news gathering practices of American media
suggests that they are unlikely to play a very useful role.
The goal of this study is to evaluate conflicting claims
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regarding the media’s contribution to cross-cutting
political exposure.
We begin by reviewing relevant research on inter-
personal communication and the mass media. We then
use two national surveys to test the proposition that the
media make a greater contribution than interpersonal
networks to Americans’ exposure to dissimilar political
views. Drawing on survey data across different media
environments, we examine three independent tests of
whether selective exposure explains our finding of
greater exposure to cross-cutting views through news
media. The results suggest that the structure of Amer-
icans’ information environments places an extraordi-
nary burden on the mass media to bring diverse
perspectives to public attention, a burden the news
media may be increasingly ill-equipped to shoulder.
INTERPERSONAL EXPOSURE TO
DISSIMILAR POLITICAL VIEWS
The verdict with respect to Americans’ interpersonal
information environments has become increasingly
bleak in the last few decades. The kind of people with
whom any given individual discusses politics is a func-
tion of two factors: the availability of discussion part-
ners in one’s immediate environment and the amount
of selectivity exercised in the choice of partners (Huck-
feldt and Sprague 1995a). Research suggests that both
factors now operate primarily to produce greater ho-
mogeneity in interpersonal interactions. With respect
to availability, residential patterns suggest increasingly
spatially segregated living even within the heteroge-
neous populations of large cities, thus prompting many
to argue that Americans are increasingly separated
from those with political views different from their own
(e.g., Calhoun 1988).1 Residential balkanization does
not necessarily mean that hordes of Americans are
choosing to live among people who share their political
views because of those views. Indeed, few Americans
assign politics such a central role in their lives. De facto
selectivity is far more likely (Freedman and Sears
1965), that is, people may choose a particular location
because it is convenient to local co-ops, or a golf
course, or the schools they want their children to
attend, and they find themselves among others who
based selection on similar considerations. The initial
goal may not have been politically like-minded neigh-
bors, but that is achieved to the extent that lifestyle
considerations correlate with political perspectives.
Exposure to dissimilar views also is inhibited by the
tendency for people to select politically like-minded
discussion partners (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995a). An
ongoing obstacle to the formation of a public sphere is
the persistent trade-off between amount of interaction
and heterogeneity of interaction. Strong ties and fre-
quent contact tend to characterize homogeneous inter-
actions, which do not bring new views to one’s atten-
tion (Granovetter 1973). Quantitative evidence of
selective exposure in interpersonal political communi-
cation is buttressed by qualitative accounts of the
courage required to speak up among heterogeneous
others (e.g., Mansbridge 1980; Schudson 1984), as well
as the lengths to which people sometimes go in order to
avoid discussing politics (Eliasoph 1998). Selectivity
appears to play a significant role in the kinds of
conversations people choose to have and, thus, the
kinds of political networks they form. If residential
choices increasingly facilitate de facto selective expo-
sure, and if people actively dodge any political conflict
that enters their lives, then the prospects for cross-
cutting interpersonal interactions appear quite bleak
indeed.
THE MEDIA CONTRIBUTION TO
CROSS-CUTTING EXPOSURE
Few concepts have played as important a role in the
history of research on mass communication as the
notion that people selectively expose themselves to
like-minded media content (Katz 1981). Beginning
with the Erie County election study (Lazarsfeld, Ber-
elson, and Gaudet 1944), this assumption became part
of the conventional view that the media have limited
effects on political attitudes (Klapper 1960). That
tradition is now considered passé, but the issue of
whether and to what extent people may selectively
expose themselves to media content has never been
fully resolved (e.g., Freedman and Sears 1965; Frey
1986; Katz 1968; Sweeney and Gruber 1984; Zillmann
and Bryant 1985). Findings have been so inconsistent
as to discourage much research, although studies of
selective attention and bias in information processing
have continued apace. Moreover, even if the many
studies of selective exposure had converged on a
central finding, they might not apply today, due to
changes in the U.S. media environment.
Evidence of selective exposure in interpersonal rela-
tions is incontrovertible, but it is less clear with respect
to the news media. Laboratory experiments that give
people a choice of exposure to pro- or counterattitu-
dinal media messages have yielded mixed results (see
Frey 1986 for a review). Furthermore, such studies are
very limited in what they can reveal about life outside
the laboratory, where people do not always have a
choice, are not always forewarned about the political
content of a message before exposure, and tend to use
a particular medium habitually rather than on a story-
by-story basis. Particularly in light of residential bal-
kanization, this question is worth reopening. Although
the media are often criticized for presenting a very
biased (e.g., Schiller 1986) or at least very narrow range
of opinions and arguments on public issues (e.g., Hallin
1986), it is doubtful that interpersonal communication
1 Because these trends have been documented strictly for residential
contexts, they do not necessarily point to greater homogeneity of
political views in people’s larger social network. For example,
encounters in the workplace provide far more exposure to dissimilar
political views than do contacts with neighbors (see, e.g., Mutz and
Mondak 1998). Nonetheless, place of residence has become more of
a lifestyle choice (Katznelson and Weir 1986), and increasing resi-
dential segregation has been noted according to race (Harrison and
Bennett 1995), education (Frey 1995), age (Frey 1995), and income
(Levy 1995).
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environments are any less parochial or provide greater
diversity.
The idea that the media may serve as an extension of
a geographically defined social context has been sug-
gested before, but typically the emphasis is on how
mass media exposure differs from face-to-face conver-
sation (e.g., Sennett [1977] 1992). An obvious differ-
ence is the extent to which they allow interactivity.
Nonetheless, if we allow that despite their noninterac-
tive nature media may have the capacity to accomplish
some of what Mill and others consider beneficial about
cross-cutting communication, then exposure to dissim-
ilar views via the media deserves attention. It is worth
noting that all three of the primary benefits of exposure
that Mill outlined—persuasion to a normatively better
view, deeper understanding of one’s own views, and the
enhanced legitimacy of political decisions—are possi-
ble without face-to-face interaction. We do not mean
to suggest that interactivity is of no value; rather, even
without it, the media may make a significant contribu-
tion. It is possible to separate the broader issue of
whether interpersonal or mass communication does
more to advance the causes of democracy from the
question of which kinds of channels best serve the need
for exposure to cross-cutting political perspectives. We
focus on this admittedly limited but nonetheless essen-
tial component of political communication.
IMPLICATIONS OF AVAILABILITY AND
SELECTIVITY
We hypothesize that mainstream news media will
surpass interpersonal communication in their capacity
to expose people to cross-cutting political perspectives
for two reasons. First, there is a greater availability of
dissimilar views in Americans’ media environments
than in their physical environments. Second, compared
to personal interactions, people have less ability and
desire to exercise selective exposure to news media
content. With respect to the availability of dissimilar
views, the media clearly have an advantage over face-
to-face communication. Mainstream reporters are gen-
erally encouraged to illustrate stories with frequent
references to people or groups who express conflicting
views, in the typical point-counterpoint format, and as
an appeal to large audiences tend to cover a range of
opinions (e.g., Zaller 1992). As businesses, American
news media are certainly not insulated from pressures
to reflect public opinion, but national political news in
local newspapers tends not to reflect local opinion
(Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998). In other words,
the news media are not subject to the more narrow
geographic constraints of face-to-face relationships,
and they do not reflect the structurally dictated homo-
geneity of immediate neighborhoods or communities.
With respect to selective exposure, it is easier to
avoid exposure to the views of personal acquaintances
than to views expressed in national news. With daily
newspapers and most national television news, the
ability to exercise choice on the basis of partisanship is
severely limited. Few communities have more than one
daily newspaper from which to choose; moreover, few
newspapers have readily recognized political complex-
ions that facilitate selective exposure to like-minded
political views. Likewise, the political tone of national
television news is very similar across channels. Of
course, the same cannot be said about news magazines,
talk shows, and political web sites. In more specialized
media, people may well be able to select a news source
that shares their political bent.
Aside from the ability to choose, media may produce
less of a desire to exercise selective exposure as well.
People often refrain from political discussions with
heterogeneous others to avoid normative social pres-
sure or the discomfort of public disagreement (Ben-
nett, Fisher, and Resnick 1994; Ulbig and Funk 1999).
These same people may be willing to expose them-
selves to media presentations, however, precisely be-
cause there is no personal interaction.
To summarize, we hypothesize that people are more
likely to expose themselves to dissonant opinions
through mediated rather than interpersonal communi-
cation, largely because of the lack of selective exposure
involved. After describing our research design, we will
evaluate contributions of the media and interpersonal
communication to cross-cutting exposure and present
results from three tests of our general thesis.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We used data from a representative national telephone
survey sponsored by the Spencer Foundation and
executed by the University of Wisconsin Survey Center
in fall 1996, immediately before the presidential elec-
tion. This survey included a battery of items that
tapped the frequency with which respondents talked
about politics with up to three political discussants,
plus five separate items assessing the extent to which
they agreed with the views of each discussant named
(see Appendix A). These five items were combined into
an additive scale that measured the extent to which
people’s networks expose them to political views unlike
their own.2 The sample of 780 respondents provided
information on more than 1,700 discussants. To obtain
information about social contexts in which weak ties
are especially likely, we asked respondents the same
five questions with respect to people they know
through work and voluntary associations, which yielded
two similar indices of exposure to political difference in
these contexts. Finally, the same battery was asked with
reference to the views respondents encountered
through reading newspapers, watching television news,
reading news magazines, and watching or listening to
talk shows, after initial screening for use of a particular
medium.3
2 Each of the five items was standardized and then combined into an
additive index for each discussant and for each media source. To
facilitate comparisons across information sources, they were also
standardized with respect to the grand mean across all potential
sources of exposure to dissimilar views. For the three primary
political discussants, Cronbach’s alpha indicated that these five items
scaled relatively well: .78, .81, and .81 for the first, second, and third
discussant, respectively.
3 Again, these items scaled acceptably: alphas of .73, .73, .69, and .81
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Although the sample is relatively small, the Spencer
survey provides a great depth of information about
exposure to political disagreement through both mass
and interpersonal channels. Moreover, multiple indi-
cators of the dependent variable make it possible to
create indices that offer more reliable measures of the
extent to which a given source provides exposure to
oppositional views, as well as the extent to which it
provides dissonant contact independent of the fre-
quency of that contact.
The survey results were supplemented with data
from the American and British components of the
Cross-National Election Project (CNEP), obtained
during the 1992 elections (for details on these studies,
see Beck, Dalton, and Huckfeldt 1992; Heath et al.
1992). Although the CNEP data provide only one
comparable single-item measure of the extent of expo-
sure to disagreement through media and interpersonal
channels, they allow us to replicate and extend our
initial findings using data that capture both perceptions
of information sources’ views (those of up to five
discussants, plus newspapers and television) and inde-
pendent assessments of the extent of political disagree-
ment, which were made possible by a “snowball”
sample of respondents’ discussants, plus a content
analysis of respondents’ newspapers.
Aside from the single-item (based on choice of
presidential candidate) measure of political disagree-
ment, the CNEP differs from the Spencer survey in one
other respect. The CNEP asked respondents to volun-
teer the names of four people with whom they dis-
cussed “important matters,” whereas the Spencer sur-
vey asked for people with whom they talked about
“government, elections and politics.” For the fifth
discussant in the CNEP questionnaire, respondents
were asked with whom they talked most “about the
events of the recent presidential election campaign,”
which generated a more explicitly political discussion
partner. Research on name generators suggests that
the explicitly political frame will produce more non-
relatives and discussants with whom there are weak ties
(Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995b). Thus, the Spencer
survey is more likely to generate discussants who will
be politically dissimilar to the respondent.
SOURCES OF EXPOSURE TO
CROSS-CUTTING POLITICAL VIEWS
Figure 1, which is based on the combined index con-
structed from these five parallel measures, summarizes
overall levels of exposure to dissimilar political views
by mass and interpersonal information sources.
Whether the items are considered separately or in
summary form, the findings are highly robust. As
hypothesized, mainstream news media, especially
newspapers and television, occupy the highest end of
the disagreement continuum, followed closely by news
magazines and more distantly by talk shows. This
pattern makes a great deal of sense in light of people’s
relative ability to exercise selective exposure to each of
these media. It is more surprising that all the media
sources, including news magazines and talk shows,
surpass interpersonal sources in the extent to which
respondents perceive them to involve views substan-
tially different from their own.4
The degree of intimacy between main respondents
and their discussants follows a highly predictable pat-
tern: Closeness is inversely related to exposure to
conflicting political views. Exposure to dissonant views
is most likely with casual acquaintances (mean expo-
sure to dissimilar views 5 .12), followed by friends
(mean 5 2.24), close friends (mean 5 21.11), and
spouses or relatives (mean 5 21.76). This significant
linear trend indicates that cross-cutting exposure de-
pends critically on contact with people who are not
close friends or family (F 5 18.35, p , .001).
Moreover, as found in previous studies, the most
frequent interactions tend to occur with the most
politically homogeneous discussion partners (Huck-
feldt and Sprague 1995a).
Even items that asked in very general terms about
the people with whom respondents discuss politics—
those known through work or a voluntary association
(rather than a named discussant)—did not generate
levels of dissimilarity as high as those for mediated
sources. These general items purposely directed re-
spondents’ attention to potentially weak ties that would
have the greatest probability of putting them in contact
with dissimilar views, but the responses still suggested
that these sources were relatively homogeneous com-
pared to the media. Likewise, an index of disagreement
drawn strictly from nonrelative discussants confirmed
that both newspapers and television expose respon-
dents to significantly greater political disagreement
than do interpersonal discussants.
The paired t-tests in the note to Figure 1 make it
clear that these mean differences cannot be explained
by political or demographic differences among the
users of various information sources; in each case, the
users of any two sources are compared to themselves.
In all possible comparisons of media sources and
discussants, the discussants were less likely to expose
respondents to dissimilar political views.
Paired comparisons maximize the sample size for
each of the tests, but they are inappropriate for hypoth-
esis testing because they do not adjust the observed
significance levels for the fact that so many compari-
sons are being made. Thus, to test our main hypothe-
sis—that mainstream media provide more exposure to
dissimilar views than face-to-face communication—we
used a repeated measures analysis of variance; the
for newspapers, national television news, news magazines, and talk
shows, respectively.
4 Given the progressive decline in concord with sequentially named
discussants shown in Figure 1, it is possible that a fourth, fifth, or
sixth discussant would have even more heterogeneous views, but it
appears that few people can name that many political discussants. In
our sample only 31% of respondents named a third person. In studies
that ask for five political discussants, the proportion who do not
name a fourth and fifth increases sharply (e.g., Huckfeldt and
Sprague 1995b), thus making it unlikely that asking about additional
discussants could overcome the large difference that we have ob-
served.
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information source was designated as a within-subjects
factor, and simple contrasts were done between a
reference condition (interpersonal exposure to cross-
cutting views) and mediated exposure to cross-cutting
views. This procedure eliminates the problem of inflat-
ing the error rate with multiple t-tests, but its disad-
vantage when used to compare all means in Figure 1 is
that the sample size for the analysis is constrained to
the smallest group of media users.
In order to retain a more representative sample, we
ran these comparisons for interpersonal communica-
tion versus newspaper readers and television viewers
only, and we used three progressively more challenging
standards for interpersonal exposure to cross-cutting
views: (1) the average dissimilarity of views within the
respondent’s political network, (2) the dissimilarity of
the third (most politically dissimilar) discussant named,
and (3) the dissimilarity of views among coworkers.
The omnibus F tests for all three analyses were highly
significant (F 5 214.35, 54.77, and 40.39, respec-
tively, p , .001 in all cases), as were the individual
contrasts between interpersonal exposure versus tele-
vision news (F 5 263.30, 69.21, and 39.84, respec-
tively, p , .001 in all cases) and interpersonal expo-
sure versus newspaper news (F 5 301.65, 71.35, and
66.02, respectively, p , .001 in all cases). Finally, we
also included income, education, political interest, and
partisanship in those models to see whether the gap
FIGURE 1. Perceived Exposure to Dissimilar Political Views by Source
Source: Spencer survey, 1996.
Note: Sample sizes are below in parentheses, with two-tailed significance levels as noted. Statistical tests are based on pairwise comparisons.
Source (n)
Disc.
1
Disc.
2
Disc.
3
Vol.
Assn.
Work-
place
Talk
Shows
News
Mags.
TV
News
Disc. 1 (715)
Disc. 2 (606) .246
Disc. 3 (446) .069 .453
Vol. Assn. (597) .000 .000 .015
Workplace (502) .000 .000 .003 .049
Talk Shows (209) .000 .000 .031 .028 .829
News Mags. (151) .000 .000 .000 .001 .002 .246
TV News (478) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .053
Newspapers (640) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .061 .064
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was especially pronounced in particular subsets of the
population. The observed gap persisted in all cases,
although partisanship was a particularly influential
covariate.
As Figure 2 illustrates, there are important differ-
ences by party: Democrats tend to find mainstream
news sources more agreeable, whereas Republicans
have significantly more homogeneous interpersonal
networks. These two tendencies combine to increase
the size of the gap between media and interpersonal
exposure to dissimilar views among Republicans, but it
is both sizable and statistically significant among Dem-
ocrats and independents as well.5 In other words, the
fundamental advantage of media in exposing people to
dissonant information transcends partisanship.
The differences between extent of exposure to polit-
ical dissonance through mainstream news media and
through interpersonal networks are clearly large, ro-
bust, and statistically significant, but one might ques-
tion whether the pattern observed in these data is
“real” or largely perceptual.6 Unlike snowball samples,
which ask named discussants about their political
views, or content analyses of media messages, our
measures examined thus far do not tap the actual
similarity or dissimilarity of views but respondents’
perceptions. These perceptions are subject to distor-
5 A repeated measures analysis of variance strictly among Democrats
that simultaneously compared the interpersonal discussant average
with exposure to difference through television and newspapers
produced very strong findings (omnibus F 5 51.68; contrast be-
tween personal network and TV: F 5 62.39; contrast between
personal network and newspapers: F 5 77.06; all p , .001).
6 Another possible challenge to our interpretation is that, for people
whose views are outside the mainstream, measures of disagreement
constructed from party or candidate preference questions may not
adequately operationalize exposure to disagreement. Many critics of
the press highlight not so much an imbalance in presenting main-
stream Republican or Democratic views as a dearth of more radical
perspectives on either side of the spectrum. It should be noted,
however, that three items in the index make no reference to parties
or candidates, and the pattern of findings is virtually identical using
an index comprised of only these three items. Thus, we do not believe
that the components of the index addressing only mainstream
political views account for the findings.
It is also possible that, even though the indices are comprised of
identical items for media and interpersonal communication, a word
such as “often” means something very different when applied to
media versus interpersonal political communication (Schaeffer
1991). Relative frequency is involved in only one of the five items in
the index. In addition, this argument should work against our
hypothesis, because phrases indicating relative frequency will tend to
mean larger absolute frequencies when the activity is more frequent,
and interpersonal exposure to political news is less frequent than
mediated exposure.
FIGURE 2. Exposure to Dissimilar Political Views by Source and Partisanship
Source: Spencer survey, 1996.
Note: Within each of the three subgroups, all comparisons between media sources (television or newspapers) and interpersonal sources (average named
discussant, workplace discussants, or voluntary association discussants) were significantly different and in the hypothesized direction ( p , .05).
Facilitating Communication across Lines of Political Difference March 2001
102
tion and inaccuracy; for example, a great deal of
interpersonal disagreement goes unrecognized, and
errors sometimes occur in recognizing agreement as
well (Huckfeldt et al. 1995).
For our purposes, we consider perceptual measures
of disagreement more appropriate than actual mea-
sures. In order for disagreement to stimulate the kind
of thought processes and reevaluation cited by Mill and
others, it must be perceived as such. If people so
misperceive others’ views as to consider them to be in
agreement, then they will not be prompted to recon-
sider their opinions, broaden their perspectives, and so
forth. Likewise, if people perceive that others dis-
agree—even if this is not the case—then the same
benefits may derive despite the lack of objective dis-
agreement. Thus, in one important sense, it may be
meaningless to ask whether people are “really” ex-
posed to views different from their own. If discussants
are hesitant to make their difference of opinion known
to friends, or if people persistently ignore differences
that are communicated to them, then such interactions
contribute little to the kinds of benefits political theo-
rists have proposed. Moreover, Huckfeldt and Sprague
(1995a) found that respondents were influenced exclu-
sively by the views they perceived their discussants to
have, not by their actual views.
Nevertheless, have we observed anything more than
a conglomeration of systematic perceptual distortions?
The question is important because research in two
areas highlights the systematic distortion in the percep-
tions of others’ views that can result from strong
partisan leanings. False consensus studies suggest that
people will overestimate the extent of their agreement
with others, and studies of the hostile media phenom-
enon indicate that people sometimes overestimate the
extent of their true disagreement with the mass media
(Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1994; Vallone, Ross, and
Lepper 1985). Separately or in combination, these
perceptual distortions may account for our finding of
greater exposure to perceived political disagreement
through the mass media than through interpersonal
communication.
Drawing on the CNEP data, Table 1 shows that most
perceptions of interpersonal agreement are accurate;
overall, for all respondent-discussant dyads, respon-
dents correctly named the political views of over 70%
of their discussants. We sorted based on whether the
distortion was in the direction of the main respondent’s
view (projection) or away from it (contrast). We then
classified these cases as strong, if the misperception
was the opposite of the discussant’s true preference, or
weak, for example, when a true independent or unde-
cided discussant was perceived as a Democrat by a
Democratic respondent.
As the bottom left panel of Table 1B shows, roughly
12% of respondents erred in the direction of their own
TABLE 1. Accuracy of Respondent Perceptions
Independent Assessment by
Actual Discussant or Newspaper
Coders
Respondents Perceive Discussants to
Favor
Respondents Perceive Newspaper to
Favor
Bush Clinton Perot No One Bush Clinton Perot No One
A. Perceived versus
Independently Assessed
Agreement and Disagreement
Bush 83% 7% 12% 43% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Clinton 7 81 19 35 71 72 67 61
Perot 9 9 63 14 4 1 0 2
No one 2 4 6 8 25 27 33 37
Percentage 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of cases (400) (458) (186) (65) (112) (364) (3) (367)
B. Accuracy and Inaccuracy by
Respondents’ Views
Inaccurate/strong projection 8% 4%
Inaccurate/weak projection 4% 17%
Accurate perceptions 78% 48%
Inaccurate/weak contrast 4% 27%
Inaccurate/strong contrast 5% 4%
Percentage 99% 100%
Number of cases (1,036) (788)
Source: Cross-National Election Project, American component (Beck, Dalton, and Huckfeldt, 1992).
Note: For Part A, the unit of analysis on the left is the total pool of dyads for which information was available from both main respondent and discussant
interviews; on the right the pool is all main respondents who read newspapers for which content analyses were available (see Appendix B). For Part B,
the unit of analysis is the same but sample sizes are slightly lower because the perceptions of respondents with inaccurate perceptions who did not
express a preference could not be categorized as contrast or projection. In Part B, we code a perception as projection when a respondent misperceives
the newspaper/discussant to agree with his/her own views but independent assessments suggest that they do not agree. We characterize this as strong
when the respondent prefers one candidate but the newspaper/discussant actually prefers a completely different candidate, and weak when the
respondent misperceives a neutral newspaper/discussant to favor his/her own preferred candidate. We code a perception as contrast when a respondent
misperceives a newspaper/discussant to disagree when independent assessments suggest that they agree. We characterize this as strong when they
favor the same candidate but the respondent perceives the newspaper/discussant to favor a different candidate, and weak when the respondent
misperceives a neutral newspaper/discussant to favor a different candidate from his/her own preference. Percentages may not add to 100 due to
rounding.
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views, and 9% in the direction opposite their own
views. The results suggest significant projection (t 5
2.72, p , .01), consistent with much of the psycho-
logical literature on this topic (e.g., Fabrigar and
Krosnick 1995; Krueger and Clement 1994).7 In other
words, systematically more errors occurred in the di-
rection of perceiving greater interpersonal agreement
(projection) than was actually the case, just as the false
consensus hypothesis predicts. The bottom line is that
people are exposed to more interpersonal disagree-
ment than they recognize, but because they fail to
recognize it, it probably has little capacity to produce
the beneficial effects of cross-cutting exposure. Con-
versely, as shown in Table 1A for newspapers, there is
a tendency to perceive greater disagreement (contrast)
with the media than content analyses suggests to be the
case.8 For newspapers, 21% of respondents showed
signs of projection, and a significantly greater 31%
showed signs of contrast (t 5 3.56, p , .001).
In Figure 3, the CNEP U.S. data seem to confirm the
pattern observed in the Spencer survey, in that people
perceive media to expose them to more oppositional
views than do their personal networks. As shown by the
solid bars, this is true across the four “important
matters” discussants as well as for the explicitly “polit-
ical” discussant. The striped bars in Figure 3 represent
independent assessments provided by discussants and
drawn from independent coding of respondents’ news-
papers.9 Figure 3 suggests that the true extent of
exposure to oppositional views may be slightly overes-
timated in the case of newspapers and somewhat
underestimated in the case of interpersonal relations.
But most important, even if one uses the “real” mea-
sures based on discussant reports and content analyses,
newspapers still provide significantly greater exposure
to views different from the respondents’ own (t 5 5.74,
p , .001). In other words, the advantage of news
media over interpersonal channels in relaying political
7 To test whether the errors were random or systematically in the
direction of respondents’ own views, we assigned values of 22 to 12
to the contrast and projection scores, with accurate perceptions equal
to 0. We then tested the hypothesis that the mean was equal to 0.
8 We use newspapers for this comparison because content analysis is
available.
9 Whether a publication favored one candidate or none was estab-
lished by running a repeated-measures analysis of variance on the
articles coded for each newspaper to see whether there was a
statistically significant difference in favorability and, if so, in what
direction. If no statistically significant difference emerged, the news-
paper was coded as favoring no one.
FIGURE 3. Perceived and Independently Measured Exposure to Dissimilar Political Views by
Source
Source: Cross-National Election Project, American component (Beck, Dalton, and Huckfeldt 1992).
Note: No independent assessment of television news content was available.
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disagreement is real, not simply a matter of perceptual
distortion.
Although the Spencer data do not include indepen-
dent measures of exposure to disagreement by source,
the results are consistent with the CNEP finding that
the relative media advantage is not simply a function of
perceptual distortion. The perceptual distortion inher-
ent in both false consensus and hostile media effects is
driven by partisanship; in the former case, it leads
people to perceive greater support for their own views
than truly exists in their environment, and in the latter
case, it leads them to perceive greater opposition.
Another way to grasp the extent of partisan distortion
in the perceptual data is to examine whether the same
relative advantage of news media over interpersonal
sources exists among political moderates or nonparti-
sans.10 Figure 2 illustrated that even independents (or
those without ideological leanings), that is, people with
little or no partisan predisposition to distort their
impressions of conflict and consensus, believe the news
media expose them to dissimilar political views more
than interpersonal sources (newspapers: t 5 6.97, p ,
.001; television: t 5 6.61, p , .001).
Figure 4 makes an additional point concerning the
relationship between partisan extremity and exposure
to cross-cutting political perspectives. If we were to
plot the hostile media hypothesis on one of these
graphs it would be U-shaped; studies demonstrating a
hostile media effect show that partisans at either end of
the spectrum will report more exposure to oppositional
views, even when the exact same media content is
involved (Vallone, Rose, and Lepper 1985). If a me-
dium were instead perceived to be more congenial to
one side of the political spectrum than the other, we
would expect a linear pattern: People at one end of the
spectrum would find it least dissimilar to their own
views, people at the other end would consider it
dissimilar, and most independents and nonpartisans
would fall somewhere between.
Figure 4 plots all the available indices of exposure to
disagreement, for both mediated and interpersonal
channels, across levels of partisanship. In addition to
showing the means for each level of partisanship, it
reveals either linear or curvilinear patterns depending
on whether trend tests across the means indicated a
significant linear or curvilinear component, with the
highest order significant pattern displayed. In the top
panel of Figure 4, for all media sources there is a
significant linear pattern; compared to Democrats,
Republicans perceive television and newspaper news as
exposing them to a great many more views unlike their
own. For talk radio, the pattern is reversed but still
linear: Democrats are more likely than Republicans to
find that the views expressed are in disagreement with
their own, and independents fall in the middle. Despite
the relative consonance of views that Republicans
perceive in talk shows, they believe this medium offers
dissimilar views to a greater extent than do their
interpersonal networks (repeated-measures analysis
for television versus personal network average among
Republicans, t 5 2.44, p , .05).
Although the earlier finding of greater contrast than
projection in perceptions of newspaper content seemed
consistent with the hostile media hypothesis, Figure 4
makes the further point that it would be erroneous to
describe this pattern as one in which partisans on both
ends of the political spectrum see the news media as
more hostile to their views than do independents (cf.
Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998).11 Democrats per-
ceive newspapers and television news to be relatively
agreeable but, as shown in Figure 2, Democrats still
consider these sources more dissonant than their inter-
personal networks.
As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 4, in contrast
to the linear patterns for media, interpersonal assess-
ments of exposure to dissimilar views consistently yield
an inverted U-shape. This indicates that, as compared
to independents, strong partisans are less exposed to
views unlike their own. The pattern holds for both the
index for average discussants and contacts in the
workplace or through voluntary associations.
If people successfully exercise selective exposure,
then one would expect to see a pattern in which strong
partisans are most likely to be exposed to consonant
information, and weaker or nonpartisans less so. In-
deed, the fact that this pattern is true for interpersonal
sources but not for mainstream media lends support to
our argument that selective exposure is less influential
in shaping people’s exposure to mediated than to
interpersonal information. There are, of course, other
differences between strong and weak partisans, but it is
worth noting that the generally narrower latitudes of
acceptance of the strongly partisan should work against
this finding; strong partisans should find more views
expressed by media and by other people disagreeable if
only because not much of a difference of opinion is
required for strong partisans to perceive a viewpoint as
unlike their own (e.g., Sherif and Hovland 1961).
Findings from the CNEP replicate these patterns.
For television news and newspapers, perceived dis-
agreement is a linear function of partisanship. For
interpersonal communication, strong partisans on both
sides of the political spectrum are exposed to less
disagreement than independents. Moreover, this pat-
tern remains curvilinear whether based on respon-
dents’ perceptions or the independent reports of dis-
cussants.
In sum, our evidence suggests that most people
perceive substantial political harmony in their interper-
sonal associations and tend to misperceive disagree-
10 Independents and those who refuse to identify themselves in
partisan terms may be quite different, but examination of these
groups separately and collectively produced the same pattern of
results.
11 We use the same data as these authors for much of our analyses,
but we arrive at different conclusions about a hostile media effect
because the single variable for partisanship (ranging from strong
Democrat to strong Republican) on which they base their interpre-
tation cannot distinguish between a hostile media pattern and the
partisan media perception we observe, i.e., only Republicans (but not
Democrats) perceive media coverage as more hostile to their views
(see Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1994; Vallone, Ross, and Lepper
1985).
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FIGURE 4. Perceived Dissimilarity of Views by Source and Strength of Partisanship
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ment that may exist. Political diversity is clearly not a
goal in social relationships for most Americans; people
tend to cultivate homogeneous interpersonal networks,
and those with strong partisan attitudes are particularly
likely to be surrounded by similar others. In compari-
son, the mainstream media expose people to more
political disagreement, regardless of partisanship or
the exremity of their views.
EXPLAINING THE MEDIA ADVANTAGE
What is it about media that enables these communica-
tion channels to more successfully expose people to
cross-cutting political viewpoints? We suggest that
people often seek political reinforcement from their
information sources, whether mass or interpersonal,
but that the extent to which people are exposed to
dissimilar views through a given source reflects varia-
tion in their motivations to exercise selective exposure
and the ease with which it is possible to do so. This
hypothesis can be tested in three different ways with
the Spencer data. First, choice should facilitate less
exposure to dissonant views. Therefore, one would
expect people with a choice of local daily newspaper to
agree more with the views in the one selected than do
those with no choice.
Second, our theory also implies that findings should
depend upon the media culture of a particular time and
place. One would expect, for example, that our findings
would be time-bound even in the United States; in the
era of the partisan press it is unlikely that people
received much except partisan reinforcement from
their daily papers (Schudson 1981). Newspapers of that
period would not have fared any better than face-to-
face communication in exposing people to cross-cut-
ting views. While we have no suitable historical data to
test this hypothesis, we can approximate such a com-
parison by comparing the contemporary United States
to a country where the press is more closely aligned
with parties and political views. Drawing on the British
component of the CNEP, we compare exposure to
cross-cutting views in American and British newspa-
pers and interpersonal networks. We expect that selec-
tive exposure is much easier when the media are
overtly partisan, and British newspapers should play a
less important role than the American press in expos-
ing people to dissimilar political views.
Third, we examine individual differences in the ex-
tent to which people are comfortable with face-to-face
conflict and thus are differentially motivated to exercise
selective exposure. Although people in general dislike
conflict, there are individual variations in how strongly
people are motivated to avoid it (Ulbig and Funk
1999). We hypothesize that the media will be respon-
sible for a particularly large proportion of a person’s
total exposure to dissonant views if he or she is
uncomfortable with face-to-face disagreement.
Local News Options
If the motivation to selectively expose one’s self influ-
ences political information consumption (despite the
difficulty in fully realizing this goal), then those who
live in areas with a choice of local daily newspapers
should be exposed to fewer dissonant views in the one
they choose. Of course, the difference in political slant
between local newspapers can be very subtle, but
nonetheless the population in multiple newspaper
towns has some degree of choice. To test our hypoth-
esis, respondents in the Spencer survey were matched
with information about the circulation of daily news-
papers in their zip code area, as obtained from the
Audit Bureau of Circulation. Zip code areas with only
one daily were coded 1; those with more than one were
coded 2. Because correlates such as income, education,
or partisanship might produce a spurious relationship
or mask a significant relationship between exposure to
dissimilar views and access to multiple newspapers,
control variables were included. For example, markets
with multiple newspapers are likely to be better edu-
cated and urban, and these demographic characteris-
tics may be associated with the likelihood of exposure
to diverse viewpoints.
As shown in Table 2, respondents in areas with more
than one newspaper reported significantly less expo-
sure to dissimilar views through their daily newspaper,
even after controlling for partisanship and other vari-
ables, although the model as a whole accounts for very
little variance in exposure to disagreement. Given the
often subtle differences in the political complexion of
newspapers within a locale, the modest size of the
effect is not surprising.
TABLE 2. The Effect of Availability of
Multiple Local Newspapers on Exposure to
Dissimilar Views in the United States
Coefficient
(s.e.) t-value
More than one newspaper
available in area 2.43* (.20) 2.20
Republican Party
identification 2.07 (.22) .30
Democratic Party
identification 2.72** (.22) 3.25
Education 2.01 (.04) .26
Age .00 (.01) .49
Sex 2.25 (.19) 1.34
Race .37 (.28) 1.34
Income .01 (.01) 1.80
Constant 1.56* (.71) 2.19
R2 .06
(n) (460)
Source: Spencer survey, 1996.
Note: Availability is coded 1 for zip code areas with only one newspaper,
2 for areas with more than one. Entries are ordinary least-squares
regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. *p , .05,
**p , .01.
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A Partisan Media Environment
A media environment with more sharply defined polit-
ical differences between newspapers provides a better
test of whether selective exposure is exercised when
conditions make it easier to do so. British voters are
well aware of the partisan slant in their newspapers,
and there are many competing products from which
they can choose (Curtice, Schmitt-Beck, and Schrott
1998, 12). If we are correct that the largely nonpartisan
U.S. press makes it difficult for people to selectively
expose themselves to media content, then we would
expect a markedly different pattern among British
respondents. Because British partisans should find it
relatively easy to exercise selective exposure, the rela-
tionship between partisanship and exposure to dissim-
ilar views should take the same curvilinear shape as for
interpersonal sources, that is, strong partisans on both
sides should be less exposed to dissimilar political
views.
Table 3 examines the relationship between strength
of partisanship and exposure to dissimilar views
through the media and interpersonal communication
for British and American respondents. In the top panel
we find in both samples the same pattern shown in
Figure 4 for interpersonal discussants in the Spencer
survey. As the significantly negative coefficients in the
top two rows of Table 3 indicate, partisanship in both
countries reduces the amount of cross-cutting interper-
sonal exposure that people experience. In the bottom
panel, the hypothesized difference between the amount
of selective exposure exercised in the two news envi-
ronments is confirmed. As anticipated, British parti-
sans on both sides are significantly less likely than
Americans to be exposed in their newspapers to polit-
ical views with which they disagree. In other words,
they can and do find news sources that mesh with their
political predispositions. Just as with face-to-face expo-
sure, strong partisanship in Britain promotes greater
selective exposure.
In contrast, the American case reveals a simple
linear pattern: compared to nonpartisans, Democrats
are less likely to encounter dissimilar views in their
newspapers than are nonpartisans, but Republicans are
more likely than are nonpartisans to do so. To confirm
a general pattern of selective exposure, both party
coefficients need to be significant and negative, but the
coefficient for Republicans is significant and positive.
In other words, given the opportunity to exercise
selective exposure through their choice of newspaper,
respondents could do so in the highly partisan British
news environment, but fewer could do so in the Amer-
ican case. The differing results can be seen in the
marginals for these dependent variables as well.
Among newspaper readers, 51% in Britain read a
paper that shares their political leanings, but in the
United States the figure is only 16%. Conversely, 35%
in the United States read a paper that explicitly dis-
agrees with their political leanings, whereas the com-
TABLE 3. Influence of Partisanship on Exposure to Dissimilar Views by Source and Country
Exposure to Dissimilar Political Views
United States Great Britain
Through Interpersonal Discussions
Republican/Conservative 2.34*** (.04) 2.27*** (.05)
Democrat/Labour 2.43*** (.04) 2.25*** (.05)
Frequency of discussion .01 (.06) 2.08* (.03)
Political interest .04 (.04) .00 (.03)
Education 2.01 (.01) .04* (.02)
Age 2.00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Gender 2.08 (.07) 2.09 (.07)
Initial log-likelihood 21556.77 21436.15
Final log-likelihood 21477.30 21408.56
x2 158.95*** 55.19***
(n) (998) (1,074)
Through Newspapers
Republican/Conservative .14*** (.04) 2.28*** (.04)
Democrat/Labour 2.27*** (.04) 2.10** (.04)
Frequency of reading .04 (.02) 2.02 (.05)
Political interest 2.04 (.05) 2.07** (.03)
Education 2.01 (.01) 2.03* (.02)
Age 2.01** (.00) 2.00 (.00)
Gender .03 (.07) 2.01 (.06)
Initial log-likelihood 21048.27 21586.51
Final log-likelihood 2991.84 21542.03
x2 112.86*** 88.94***
(n) (1,033) (1,687)
Source: Cross-National Election Project, British and American components, 1992.
Note: For interpersonal discussion, the dependent variable is the average exposure to dissimilar views through all the respondent’s discussants; for
newspapers, it is the extent of exposure to dissimilar political views through the respondent’s most often read newspaper on the same scale. Entries are
ordered probit coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Cutpoints are not shown. *p , .05, **p , .01, ***p , .001.
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parable figure in Britain is only 20%. In both countries
there is more cross-cutting exposure through newspa-
pers than through interpersonal networks, but the
difference between the extent to which newspapers and
interpersonal communication provide exposure to dis-
similar views is significantly larger for Americans (t 5
4.58, p , .001). Selective exposure clearly occurs
under the right real world conditions; when people
have a choice, they tend to use it to reduce their
exposure to cross-cutting political views.
Comfort with Face-to-Face Controversy
In addition to limited opportunities to exercise selec-
tive exposure, the media advantage over interpersonal
sources may be due to its impersonal nature, which
circumvents the discomfort of face-to-face controversy.
Beyond fewer opportunities to exercise selective expo-
sure, Americans may have less motivation to do so with
mass media. We hypothesize that people will obtain a
larger relative proportion of their total exposure to
dissimilar views from interpersonal communication if
they are comfortable with face-to-face conflict. As a
test we used two survey items designed to assess the
communication patterns encouraged during early po-
litical socialization in the family (see Appendix A for
question wording and McLeod and Chaffee 1972 for a
review of the literature). For our purposes, it matters
little whether these items tap accurate recollections of
parental behavior or reflect current attitudes toward
controversy. In either case, we anticipate that people
who are uncomfortable with face-to-face conflict are
likely to get more of their dissonant information from
the media relative to people who are comfortable with
interpersonal conflict.
We compared the average level of exposure to
disagreement in respondents’ interpersonal networks
with the average level for television and newspapers,
subtracting the former from the latter. A high score on
this measure indicates greater media exposure to dis-
sonance, and a low score indicates greater interper-
sonal exposure. Because these difference measures are
not independent of overall exposure levels, we included
a control for the total amount, that is, the sum of media
and interpersonal exposure. This allowed us to esti-
mate the relative importance of the media, controlling
for the effect of overall exposure levels. Due to the
obvious role of general political interest in motivating
exposure, it was also included.
As shown in Table 4, the total amount of exposure to
dissimilar views positively predicts the importance of
media relative to interpersonal sources. The relative
importance of media is especially great for Republi-
cans, who have significantly more homogeneous inter-
personal networks than Democrats. In contrast, a high
level of education makes the media less important
vis-à-vis interpersonal sources. Most important for our
hypothesis about why people turn to the media is the
controversy scale, which is a significant negative pre-
dictor of the relative importance of the media. In other
words, as expected, people who are comfortable with
face-to-face conflict get a relatively larger amount of
their dissonant information interpersonally rather than
from the media. The opposite is true for people who
find controversy unpleasant; they are more likely to be
exposed to dissimilar views through the media. This
finding supports our proposition that impersonality
helps explain the media advantage. Variability in selec-
tive exposure reflects not only the availability of parti-
san information sources, as shown in tables 2 and 3, but
also individual differences in the desire to avoid inter-
personal conflict.
DISCUSSION
Communication across lines of political difference is
essential to the social psychological basis of a pluralist
society. Pluralism requires that a society be able to
endure ongoing political and moral disagreement (e.g.,
Berlin 1969). Furthermore, according to most demo-
cratic theorists, the expression of opposing political
views is integral to the democratic process. Yet, the
desire for harmony in interpersonal relationships
makes political disagreement both relatively infrequent
and particularly difficult to convey successfully. In
addition, residential balkanization in the United States
is decreasing the likelihood of heterogeneous face-to-
face interaction. These factors make it all the more
important to understand the avenues through which
people obtain exposure to dissimilar political views.
Our findings suggest that media are far more important
than interpersonal networks in exposing people to
views unlike their own. As a result, the media have the
potential to make an extremely important contribution
TABLE 4. Relative Importance of the Media
in Exposure to Dissimilar Views by Comfort
with Controversy
Coefficient
(s.e.) t-value
Comfort with face-to-face
controversy 2.37* (.16) 2.35
Total exposure to
dissimilar views (media
average 1
interpersonal average) .47*** (.05) 9.21
Political interest (high) .35 (.34) 1.02
Republican Party
identification 3.74*** (.70) 5.33
Democratic Party
identification .58 (.66) .89
Education 2.26* (.13) 2.06
Age .01 (.02) .40
Income .01* (.00) 2.30
Race 2.65 (.82) .79
Gender 2.67 (.56) 1.19
Constant 5.59* (2.36) 2.37
R2 .38
(n) (305)
Source: Spencer survey, 1996.
Note: The dependent variable is the relative importance of the media
(averaged level) compared to interpersonal network (averaged level).
Entries are ordinary least-squares regression coefficients, with standard
errors in parentheses. *p , .05, ***p , .001.
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to awareness of diverse political perspectives and thus
to national political integration.12
Our findings also have implications for many debates
regarding the media and public opinion in the United
States. On the one hand, the stereotypes that Lipp-
mann (1922) feared capable of eliminating exposure to
dissonant viewpoints altogether appear to be potent
but limited forces. Selective exposure is exercised with
respect to interpersonal contacts in the contemporary
United States, to be sure, but at least as of the 1990s,
the structure of mainstream media makes it difficult for
people to screen out large amounts of oppositional
information. On the other hand, cross-cutting exposure
and intrapersonal awareness of oppositional views does
not necessarily translate into the kind of face-to-face
deliberation that theorists such as Dewey (1927) had in
mind. Nonetheless, traditional news media such as
newspapers and television news hold the potential for
creating greater awareness of cross-cutting views.
Many theorists, like Dewey, have suggested that only
face-to-face deliberation can bring about the kind of
democratic ends implied by the notion of a public
sphere (e.g., Barber 1984; Fishkin 1991). Others em-
phasize that, “in modern societies, public deliberation
is (and probably must be) largely mediated” (Page
1996). The usual rationale is that the mass media may
be fine for relaying information, but they are not very
useful for fostering public discourse and collective
action, because they are essentially one-way communi-
cation to people in spatially dispersed and privatized
settings (Carey 1987).13 This argument makes consid-
erable sense if collective action or consensus-building is
the outcome of interest. But if one focuses instead on
the importance of exposure to political perspectives in
order to promote awareness of diverse viewpoints,
political tolerance, and benefits of this kind, then the
inherent limitations on the media’s contributions are
less obvious.
The sheer idea that mass media might serve to the
benefit of the public sphere strikes most as heretical.
But, in assessing media’s contribution, there is a ten-
dency to rely on an ideal standard drawn from inter-
personal communication, typically akin to the ideal
speech situation (Habermas 1989) in which everyone
has an equal opportunity to participate, everyone lis-
tens to and carefully considers others’ views, and so
forth (e.g., Fishkin 1991; Knight and Johnson 1994).
This “conversational ideal” is not drawn from real-
world experience, but it is often used as the standard
against which media are judged and found wanting:
“We are not really interested in what face-to-face
communication is like: rather, we have developed a
notion that all communication should be like a certain
model of conversation, whether that model really exists
or not” (Schudson 1982, 43, emphasis in original).
Instead, if we compare the reality of face-to-face
political communication with the reality of media po-
litical communication, we have a more solid foundation
on which to base conclusions about the contributions
that both forms may make to a public sphere. There is
a disappointing tendency toward homogeneity in face-
to-face political communication, whereas the media
can transcend interpersonal geography and expose
people to views unlike their own. Regardless of one’s
views on whether the media present a broad enough
range of perspectives, it is clear that for many Ameri-
cans they are the main source of exposure to cross-
cutting political views. Compared to most interper-
sonal networks, they are hotbeds of diversity, not
because the media are doing such an exemplary job
pursuing diversity, but because individuals are doing
such a poor one, in part because of the desire to avoid
conflict in interpersonal situations. The media send
multiple conflicting messages, and in so doing they
advance an important aspect of the democratic pro-
cess.
Of course, the patterns we have observed could
simply be interpreted as evidence of the media’s lim-
ited influence on political attitudes. That is, if homo-
geneous interpersonal channels persuade people to
hold certain views, and the media are not equally
persuasive, then the media will, as a result, appear to
provide more exposure to dissimilar views. Even if this
were the case, it still could be argued that media play
an important role in furthering cross-cutting exposure
in a way that interpersonal communication does not
and perhaps cannot. Previous studies have found lim-
ited support for the social cohesion view of the effect of
political discussants (cf. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995a;
Kenny 1994), that is, that the cohesiveness of social
relationships determines their persuasiveness. But re-
gardless of the relative power one attributes to mass or
interpersonal communication to persuade people to
change their mind, any exposure to differing views that
does not produce instantaneous compliance is a valu-
able component of public opinion formation and of the
process of legitimizing differing views within a pluralist
system.
In the contemporary United States, the major prob-
lem with looking to media to fulfill this role is the
current trend toward highly specialized rather than
mass channels. The breakup of the network broadcast
monopoly, the proliferation of Internet news sources,
and the potential they offer for tailoring news to one’s
own interests and prejudices are only a few signs of this
12 Our findings are consistent across two data sets and two presiden-
tial elections, but this could be a function of similarities between the
1992 and 1996 elections. For example, the perception among Repub-
licans and Democrats of media favoritism toward Clinton may be a
function of his front-runner status in both cases. Nonetheless, our
findings are consistent with many previous studies in suggesting that
Americans perceive media content as to the left of their positions
and consider journalists more liberal than the general population
(Weaver and Wilhoit 1996). This does not necessarily mean that the
content journalists produce favors one side, but the perception is that
the mainstream media lean left if they lean at all (Watts et al.).
13 Much has been made of the importance of direct interpersonal
relationships in nurturing a sphere of politically oriented discourse,
but a growing number of perspectives challenge that idea. Sanders
(1997), for example, points out that the formal standards for the
deliberative ideal are seldom, if ever, met. As usually practiced,
face-to-face deliberative decision making may essentially perpetuate
and exacerbate social inequalities. Schudson (1997) disputes the
conversational ideal that pervades current writing on the quality of
public life, arguing that democracy has little to do with the kind of
intimacy and community that characterize this romanticized view of
face-to-face interaction.
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trend. As the number of potential news sources multi-
plies, consumers must choose among them, and that
exercise of choice may lead to less diversity of political
exposure. Although media observers have long la-
mented the lack of choice in news sources, the prolif-
eration of choice creates new problems. Advertisers
and media firms are now working together to create
“electronic equivalents of gated communities” (Turow
1997, 2). The market segments they identify often are
not based explicitly on political views, but “lifestyle”
categories are hardly independent of political leanings.
Turow (1997, 3) argues that “segment-making me-
dia,” those which “encourage small slices of society to
talk to themselves,” are on the rise, whereas “society-
making media,” which “have the potential to get all
those segments to talk to each other,” are on the
decline. This leaves the future of the mass audience in
question (cf. Neuman 1991). These developments ob-
viously do not bode well for the future of communica-
tion across lines of political difference. In addition to
reducing the amount of direct exposure to dissonant
views, specialized media and fragmented audiences
may have secondary negative effects on interpersonal
communication, since shared viewing or reading may
encourage conversations across partisan lines (Katz
1996).
Ironically, the mass media’s greatest strength may
not be facilitation of the “Great Community” of soli-
darity envisioned in the early twentieth century by
media philosophers such as Cooley and Dewey (Simon-
son 1996). Instead, media’s greatest potential lies in its
impersonal exposure of audiences to cross-cutting
views, an essential form of communication in a highly
pluralistic society. In order to sustain this benefit,
however, news media must be structured so as to limit
the public’s capacity for selective exposure.
APPENDIX A. THE SPENCER SURVEY
Design
This national telephone survey was conducted by the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Survey Center from September 1996
through election eve using random digit dialing. Each num-
ber was screened to verify that it was associated with a
household. The person selected for the interview was ran-
domly chosen from among household members at least 18
years old, with no substitutions allowed. The response rate
was 47%, calculated as the proportion of completed inter-
views divided by total sample (which includes those who
never answered and all other nonresponses and refusals)
minus the nonsample numbers. This is virtually identical to
the rate obtained in the CNEP survey. Interviews averaged 25
minutes. A maximum of 30 calls were made to each nonan-
swering or otherwise unresolved telephone number.
Discussant Generator
“From time to time, people discuss government, elections,
and politics with other people. We’d like to know the first
names or just the initials of people you talk with about these
matters. These people might be from your family, from work,
from the neighborhood, from some other organization you
belong to, or they might be from somewhere else. Who is the
person you’ve talked with most about politics? [Discussant
#1] Aside from this person, who is the person you’ve talked
with most about politics? [Discussant #2] Aside from anyone
you’ve already mentioned, is there anyone else you’ve talked
with about politics? [Discussant #3]” If at any point the
respondent could not give a name: “Well then, can you give
the first name of the person with whom you were most likely
to have informal conversations during the course of the past
few months?”
Media Source Generators
Newspapers: “During the past week, did you read one or more
newspapers? Which newspaper was that?”
Television News: “During the past week, did you watch any
national news programs on television? What national news
show was it that you watched? Which news program do you
watch most often [if respondent names more than one]?”
News Magazines: “During the past week, did you read any
news or current events magazines, such as U.S. News, Time,
Newsweek, or some other news magazine? Which magazine
was that?”
Political Talk Shows: “During the past week, did you
happen to see a talk show on television or hear a talk show on
the radio that included some discussion of political or social
issues? What talk show was that?”
Voluntary Associations and Workplace
Generators
Respondents were first asked about membership and partic-
ipation in a list of types of voluntary associations, similar to
those used in the General Social Survey. People who claimed
membership in more than one such group were randomly
assigned to one of the groups for a follow-up sequence, which
asked identically worded questions parallel to those asked
about the political discussants. These same five items were
also asked with reference to coworkers, clients, or customers
that employed respondents encountered in the workplace.
The five items asking about voluntary associations produced
an alpha of .74, and the same items referring to the workplace
scaled at .72.
Five-Item Index of Exposure to Dissimilar
Views
1. “Compared with [named discussant, media outlet, volun-
tary association, or workplace], would you say that your
political views are much the same [low], somewhat differ-
ent, or very different [high]?”
2. “Do you think [named discussant, media outlet, voluntary
association, or workplace] normally favors Republicans or
Democrats, or both, or neither?” Scoring: same as respon-
dent’s partisanship (low), different from respondent’s par-
tisanship (high), or neither.
3. “Which presidential candidate, if any, does [named dis-
cussant, media outlet, voluntary association, or workplace]
favor? Clinton, Dole, Perot, or some other candidate?”
Scoring: same as respondent’s preference (low), different
from respondent’s preference (high), or neither.
4. “Overall, do you feel [named discussant, media outlet,
voluntary association, or workplace] shares most of your
views on political issues [low], opposes them [high], or
doesn’t [it/person’s name] do either one?”
5. Media version: “How often do you disagree with political
views you [read/hear] about in/on the [media outlet]?
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Often [high], sometimes, rarely, or never [low]?” Discus-
sant version: “When you discuss politics with [named
discussant, voluntary association, or workplace], do you
disagree often [high], sometimes, rarely or never [low]?”
Closeness of Relationship
“Is [named discussant] a close friend, just a friend, or just
someone that you regularly come into contact with?” Spouses
and relatives were coded into a fourth category.
Frequency of Political Discussion
Discussant Version: “When you talk with [named discussant],
do you discuss politics a lot, some, a little, or very rarely?”
Media Version: “When you read/watch [named media
outlet], do you read/watch stories about politics a lot, some,
a little, or not at all?”
Partisanship
“Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican,
Democrat, independent, or what?”
Political Interest
“Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government
and public affairs most of the time, whether there’s an
election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would
you say you follow what’s going on in government and public
affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then,
or hardly at all?”
Comfort with Controversy
“When you were growing up, about how often did your
[parents or guardians] take the position that certain topics
are better left undiscussed? Often, sometimes, rarely, or
never?” Scoring: 1 5 often . . . 4 5 never.
“How often did they have spirited discussions on contro-
versial matters like politics or religion? Often, sometimes,
rarely, or never?” Scoring: 1 5 never . . . 4 5 often.
The scale based on these two measures ranged from 2 to 8.
APPENDIX B. CROSS-NATIONAL ELECTION
PROJECT SURVEY: AMERICAN AND
BRITISH COMPONENTS
Design
The American component of the CNEP combined a national
survey with a survey of discussants named by main respon-
dents and a content analysis of 40 newspapers conducted
during the 1992 presidential election (for details and reliabil-
ity of content measures, see Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt
1998; Dalton et al. 1998). The national survey was drawn
from 40 county clusters around the United States (48 states),
and the major newspaper read by residents in each of the
counties was selected for content analysis. The British survey
component was included as a module in the British General
Election Cross-Section survey of 1992. Full details of the
survey design and administration are given in Beck, Dalton,
and Huckfeldt (1992) for the American survey, and Heath et
al. (1992) for the British survey.
The newspaper sampling was done every third day and
every Sunday from Labor Day to Election Day; a maximum
of 27 days were coded for each paper, depending on its
circulation pattern. On each coding day all stories that dealt
directly with the presidential campaign and/or candidates and
that appeared in the first half of the first news section were
coded, as well as any special election pages and campaign-
related stories on the editorial pages. Coders were instructed
as follows: “Code the overall content of the article that
involves Bush, Quayle, or the Bush/Quayle campaign in
terms of its favorability or unfavorability to the Bush cam-
paign. Evaluate the article from the perspective of the Bush
campaign and assess the content of the article from this
perspective. In other words, would the Bush campaign like
seeing this article in print?” (Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt
1992). The same instructions applied for Clinton/Gore and
for Perot. We aggregated across all articles in a newspaper to
obtain an average favorability/unfavorability score for each
candidate. Newspapers were coded as favoring a candidate if
his score was higher than that of the other two candidates and
the differences were statistically significant at the p , .05
level.
Discussant Generator
“Now let’s shift our attention to another area. From time to
time, most people discuss important matters with other
people. Looking back over the last six months, I’d like to
know the people you talked with about matters that are
important to you. Can you think of anyone? What is this
person’s first name? Is there anyone else you talk with about
matters that are important to you?” Up to four names are
accepted, then: “Aside from anyone you have already men-
tioned, who is the person you talked with most about the
events of the recent presidential election campaign?”
Perceived Disagreement with the Media
Respondents were asked: “In the presidential election, which
one of the candidates did you prefer?” They also were asked:
“Which presidential candidate do you think [the newspaper]
favored during the campaign, or didn’t it favor any candi-
date?” The two responses were compared, and scoring was as
follows: 0 5 absolute agreement (respondent and newspaper
concur), 1 5 mixed (either respondent or newspaper is
independent/neutral), and 2 5 disagreement (respondent
and newspaper disagree). Television news magazine and talk
show scoring was the same.
For the British sample, similar items were used with
respect to the Conservative or Labour Party, and scoring was
the same.
Perceived Disagreement with Discussant
A comparison was made between self-reported candidate
support and the perceived support of Clinton, Bush, or Perot
by the named discussants: “Which candidate do you think
[discussant] supported in the presidential election this year?”
Scoring: 0 5 absolute agreement (respondent and discussant
concur), 1 5 mixed (either respondent or discussant is
independent/neutral), and 2 5 disagreement (respondent
and discussant disagree).
A similar scale with respect to the Conservative and
Labour parties was used for the British sample, and scoring
was the same. To compare a single indicator of interpersonal
exposure to disagreement, perceived disagreement was aver-
aged across however many discussants a respondent named.
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Independently Assessed
Agreement/Disagreement
For newspapers, assessment is based on the candidate that
the respondent supported and the favorability score for the
relevant newspaper as determined by content analysis. Scor-
ing: 0 5 absolute agreement (respondent and newspaper
concur), 1 5 mixed (either respondent or newspaper is
independent/neutral), and 2 5 disagreement (respondent
and newspaper disagree). For discussants, assessment is
based on the respondent’s self-report and the named discus-
sants’ self-reports, scored on the same three-point scale.
Accuracy, Projection, and Contrast
Accuracy, projection, and contrast were measured by the
ability of main respondents to identify correctly the candidate
supported by either their named discussants (as revealed in
the discussant survey) or by their local newspaper (as re-
vealed in content analysis). If the perceptions of the main
respondent matched the independent assessment by coders
or discussants, then they were scored as accurate. If the
respondent judged the discussant or newspaper to be in more
agreement than was the case, the respondent was scored as
projecting. If the respondent judged the discussant or news-
paper to be in less agreement than was the case, the
respondent was scored as contrasting.
American Partisanship
(1) “Many people lean toward a particular political party for
a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a
different party. Do you generally lean toward a particular
party?” (2) “If you had to choose, do you think of yourself as
closer to the Republican or the Democratic party?” (3)
“Taken altogether, how strongly or weakly do you lean
toward the [Republican, Democratic] party? Would you say
very strongly, fairly strongly, moderately, fairly weakly, or
very weakly?”
British Partisanship
Form A: “Generally speaking, what do you think of yourself
as [names of political parties]? Do you think of yourself as
closer to one party? Which? How strong [name party] are
you?” Form B: “Generally speaking, what do you think of
yourself as?” “Which of the following parties do you feel a
little closer to?” “How strong [name party] are you?”
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